Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Asia-Pacific Region

In the evolving global landscape, the Asia-Pacific region is characterized by intense economic and geopolitical competition among major powers, namely Russia, China, and the United States (three of the five recognized nuclear states). In response to China’s growing influence, the U.S. is strengthening military partnerships with key regional allies through both bilateral and minilateral formats, including the AUKUS defense pact, deeper military ties with South Korea, and high-level trilateral security meetings with South Korea and Japan. All of these initiatives in one way or another feature a nuclear component. This article aims to determine whether these actions pose a threat to the international non-proliferation regime. One of the main issues discussed is AUKUS members’ initiative to supply Australia with nuclear submarines. An analysis of existing comprehensive safeguards agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and non-nuclear-weapon states (such as Australia) points to vulnerabilities associated with non-proscribed military use of nuclear materials. It is noted that, as of now the IAEA lacks the expertise and mechanisms to effectively monitor such military programs. Particular attention is also given to the possible consequences of the transfer of nuclear submarines and submarine technology to Australia, such as setting a dangerous precedent. The author expresses concern that South Korea and Japan may seek nuclear submarines next, noting that South Korea has already openly expressed interest in pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The author concludes that the formation of new military alliances in the region could lead to serious and far-reaching consequences for the non-proliferation regime, the extent of which remains difficult to predict at this point.